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Possibly the most famous lecture series in the
UK is the BBC-sponsored Reith lectures. The
1999 lectures developed the major theme of
globalisation. While neither I, nor I suspect
my predecessors, would lay claim to the
authority or breadth of analysis of the Reith
lecturers, the series as a whole is beginning to
offer a distinctive coherence to the analysis of
information society studies. Each of the
previous three Ameritech, now Epixtech,
Lectures has focused on grand themes. In the
first lecture Trevor Hayward (1997)
described the role and dangers of the
technology, fearing that profit motives would
take precedence over social enrichment. Chris
Batt (1999) then examined the role of the
library in delivering the information society,
which he saw as a continuum of change and
not a transformation and with the aspiration
that the library should be the heart and brain
of the new society. And last year Frank
Webster (1999) looked at democratic
dissatisfaction and the role ± or absence of a
role ± for technology in resolving the current
lack of involvement with politics. This paper
will focus on the role of the state in converting
revolutionary movements into acceptable
societies and in particular will examine the
potential of national information policies as
the keystone in converting the Information
Revolution into an information society.
Four themes will be developed. The
Agrarian and Industrial Revolutions offer
precedents and lessons for the management of
the Information Revolution and will be
examined. Secondly, the nature of and
background to the issues will be considered.
Typically these are both global and universal
in nature. Thirdly, the nature of the Internet
and its presently inflated pretensions will be
described. Finally the responsibility and the
role of the state will be considered,
particularly in the context of an information
policy. It will be the contention of this paper
that history shows that the state must involve
itself in transforming society and suggest the
issues which have to be considered.
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From revolution to society
It is a common and convenient model to
suggest that we are entering the third great era
of mankind (Duff, 2000). The first began
with the Agrarian Revolution when man
moved from a nomadic hunter-gatherer
society to a more or less stable and settled
society based on the cultivation of food. The
second was the Industrial Revolution based
on the conversion of natural resources into
goods and the development of science and
engineering. The third is the Information
Revolution based on the manipulation of
knowledge and the products of the mind.
That third revolution is displaying many of
the characteristics of the first two and this
may give us some insight into the potential
and threats as the Information Revolution is
transformed into the Information Society.
Curiously, while this three-society model has
gained wide acceptance, there has been little
apparent attempt to consider what lessons, if
any, might be learnt from history. And yet it
does seem that there are common strands
from which such lessons can be learned.
Naturally these divisions between revolutions
are never clear or absolute. One can still see
horse-drawn ploughs in Poland and Stone
Age cultures in New Guinea, but they provide
a convenient structure for debate
The Agrarian Revolution
Each of these revolutions has an iconic
technology. In the case of the Agrarian
Revolution (Diamond, 1997) it was the plough
although arguably the wheel was a more
important development. But as we shall see
with the other two revolutions, it is not the
iconic technology that is important but the
communications infrastructure. The enabler of
the new society was the road ± whether the
Roman road or the King's highway, the road
provided a secure infrastructure for the
creation of trade through the movement of
surplus food and for the developing of trade
specialisms. The revolution is characterised by
a freebooting spirit based on force, whether
that of tribal chiefs, Roman senators or robber
barons such as Simon de Montfort. But the
state, too, had a role. Its most important
contribution was that of currency, which
allowed trade to develop. In addition the state
offered what would now be called a regulatory
infrastructure of a legal code and a security
system for the roads. The state itself was
feudal, hereditary and imperial, and slavery
became common. On the one hand it was
based on strict class or hierarchical systems,
but it was also imperial in the sense that it
depended on conquest rather than nationality.
Empires were defined by names such as
Roman, Elizabethan, Hapsburg or Ottoman.
The winners, if they can be so called, were
landowners and possession of land was what
defined status. The losers were nomads and
hunter-gatherers who did not possess land.
The Industrial Revolution
Here the iconic technology was the steam
engine, which led to manufacture and mass
production. But it was again the
communications infrastructure which turned
a revolution into a society. It was the railways
and canals that allowed the revolution to
flourish into a society. It was invention and
entrepreneurship and individual activity
which drove the revolution forward in the Age
of Improvement. Here in Edinburgh one
might mention as an example the prodigious
activity of the Stevenson family. Robert
Stevenson was engineer to the Northern
Lights Board, reflecting the state's interest in
managing safety, and grandfather of Robert
Louis Stevenson. Although famed for the
development of lighthouses, `` [Stevenson's]
records for the time show a steady flow of
reports and estimates for harbours, bridges,
piers, canals, drainage schemes, steamboats,
roads, memorials, prisons, railways and fog
signals'' (Bathurst, 1999). The discipline of
engineering was virtually invented in a few
short decades by such amazing polymaths.
Yet here too a new class of industrialist such
as Carnegie became known as Robber
Barons, mimicking the spirit of a much earlier
period. But the state again provided a growing
regulatory infrastructure as the revolution
became embedded in society. In areas as
varied as industrial safety, whether the
Plimsoll Line or the removal of child labour,
standards such as railway gauges or in the
prosecution of free trade or the development
of general education and welfare systems, the
state created an environment which
encouraged expansion. The state in turn
became both national and increasingly
democratic and slavery ended ± at least
officially. The nation state as we currently
know it is largely a product of the mid-
nineteenth century, while the progressive
enfranchisement of the population allowed a
non-hereditary eÂlite to emerge. The winners
were industrialists and manufacturers, while
landowners began their decline to genteel
poverty. The other great category of losers
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was that of the trades which surrounded the
horse-based economy. Farriers, blacksmiths
and stable-owners swiftly disappeared as
major economic groups.
The Information Revolution
Here the iconic technology is the computer, but
again it is the communications infrastructure ±
the network ± which has allowed the revolution
to begin the transformation of society. Some of
the other lessons are as yet less clear, but using
the precedent of the first two revolutions we
may discern the outline of what will create the
information society. The role of the state is
again to be found in providing the regulatory
environment. We can see the development of
mass higher education through the need for a
higher skill set; we can see a regulatory
environment such as in the recent sale of
telecommunication licences; we can see some
legislation and security regulations emerging.
Yet we still have the robber barons. Lord
Thomson of Fleet famously remarked that
having a television franchise was like having a
licence to print money, while figures as varied as
Bill Gates, Robert Maxwell and Rupert
Murdoch are only the first and the most famous
of a tribe now caricatured as dot.com
millionaires. We might then feel that the nature
of the state itself is changing. It is an increasing
commonplace that the state is at the mercy of
global corporations, which can bypass national
conventions. In his 1999 Reith lecture series
Anthony Giddens noted:
The radicals argue that not only is globalisation
very real, but that its consequences can be felt
everywhere . . . Nations have lost most of the
sovereignty they once had, and politicians have lost
most of their capability to influence events. It isn't
surprising that no one respects political leaders any
more, or has much interest in what they have to
say. The era of the nation state is over. Nations, as
the Japanese business writer Keniche Ohmae puts
it, have become mere `` fictions'' [1].
Whether it is a currency speculator such as
Soros attacking currencies in ways much more
damaging than any military adventure, or
global conglomerates such as the Disney
Corporation or News International, richer than
most nation states, or criminals such as
Colombian drug barons, these global groups
appear to be wresting power from the nation
state. Their form of government appears
increasingly oligarchic with the odd dose of
heredity. The most obvious winners in this
revolution are content providers, although no
doubt others will emerge. It is then cheering to
note that thanks to the persistent curiosity and
invention of individuals, anarchists may also
emerge as winners. The ability of the authors of
the Love Bug and Melissa viruses to puncture
the thick hide of these corporations or the 15-
year-old boy in Montreal who can penetrate
the Pentagon defences should be welcomed.
Lessons
The template used to describe these three
revolutions allows us to begin to adduce some
general lessons about the role of the state.
The first and most important is the need to
create a benign regulatory environment. It is
clear that transformation comes through the
work and inspiration of individuals, but if they
are not to make developments purely at the
expense of the community, the state has to
provide a set of acceptable rules and police
these rules. Next it must mobilise human
capital. The progressive expansion of
education to all classes, all cultural groups
and significantly to all genders has been and
continues to be an essential function of the
state. Thirdly it has to arrange ± note arrange
not provide ± an equal access to a high quality
communications infrastructure, whether
roads, telephones or networks. In this respect
the Bangemann Report (Bangemann, 1994)
for the European Union, which proposed
leaving the creation of networks to the
market, must be seen as a pernicious and
malign influence. Finally, it must mobilise
and encourage the private sector to take and
be appropriately rewarded for the risks
associated with these developments.
The global issues [2]
Poverty is an issue in almost every country,
although it means different things in different
places. Tabo Mbeke, President of South
Africa, recently and famously pointed out at a
G7 summit that there are more telephones in
Manhattan than in Sub-Saharan Africa and
that most people alive today will never make
or receive a telephone call. Alabama has a
higher illiteracy rate than Cuba while
participation in tertiary education in West
Belfast runs at 2 per cent against a national
average of almost 50 per cent [3].
Equity is a second key global issue. Equity
between countries, between racial groups,
genders and individuals has been the goal of all
democratic states and while we may have
moved a long way from the Marxist notion of
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`` from each according to his abilities, to each
according to his needs'', the goal of equal
opportunity to benefit from social and technical
progress remains a powerful driver if not yet a
universal ambition. At the state level inequity is
a key factor in attempted military solutions to
social and national divisions, which we can see
in countries from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe.
Social inclusion is another key factor in the
development of well balanced and happy
communities. For every Margaret Thatcher
declaring that society does not exist
(Thatcher, 1987), there is a John F. Kennedy
declaring that if a free society cannot help the
many who are poor it cannot save the few who
are rich (Kennedy, 1961). Worry is regularly
expressed by governments about the
development of an excluded social underclass
which has the potential to damage the
development of any society and history is
littered with revolutions by slaves, peasants,
disenfranchised ethnic groups and oppressed
minorities of every sort. Social exclusion leads
to social disorder and a whole variety of non-
governmental agencies as well as governments
place high priority on preventing this.
Government/private sector balance is another
global concern. The state can rarely afford the
luxury of developing or owning all that it wishes
to provide for society. A key role of
governments is then balancing what it should
provide, what it should leave to the individual
to provide and what it should encourage or
regulate the private sector to provide.
Education for all or at least educational
opportunity for all is an ancient Scottish fetish.
The concept of the `` lad o pairts'' is one long
familiar to us. Michael Young neatly summed
this up and captured the essence of the three
great eras in his coining of the term
`` meritocracy'': `` not an aristocracy of birth, not
a plutocracy of wealth, but a true meritocracy
of talent'' (Young, 1958). This can again be
illustrated in all societies and at all levels
whether in the British Government's wish to
push participation in tertiary education up to
the 50 per cent level or in the decision of the
newly elected Government of Malawi to offer
free primary education to all girls.
Information rich and information poor is the
final global issue to be mentioned. There can
be little quarrel with the phrase since almost
everything in life from food to Rolls Royce cars
displays the existence of haves and have-nots.
But in terms of information it is a much more
complicated phenomenon than is often
supposed. Hayward saw it as a function of
wealth. As disparities of wealth have grown in
all countries in recent years, he envisages an
eÂlite and wealthy class with access to
technology, oppressing the vast majority of the
population without such access (Hayward,
1997). But it can be argued that this is an over-
simplistic approach to the phenomenon.
Language is a factor. The inexorable growth of
English as the language of the Internet
disenfranchises important socio-economic
groups. The existence of plutocratic dinosaurs
unable or unwilling to use a terminal and
leaving such menial chores to secretaries will no
doubt diminish but is real ± our own beloved
Prime Minister being a classic example of this.
Lack of access to communications is a
determinant, but this applies to everyone in
small communities remote from major centres
rather than the economically poor. Conversely
technologies as varied as television, inventions
such as the clockwork radio and the apparent
ubiquity of the mobile telephone suggest that
access to technology is not alone the
determinant of information poverty. Internet
cafeÂs are as available in Sri Lanka or
Thessaloniki as in San Francisco.
Finally let me suggest that these global
issues offer three lessons to governments,
lessons which were just as valid in the earlier
revolutions. First, technology is not patriotic.
It is a terrifying thought that it is claimed that
90 per cent of the world's computers use
Microsoft Office. Technology is sold where it
makes a profit and may usefully if unfairly be
compared with the amorality of the arms
industry. Second, investment capital is not
patriotic. A totally market-driven laissez-faire
approach to development is an abdication of
responsibility and can lead to the sort of
despoliation of the state last seen in the rush
to acquire the mineral resources of Africa last
century. Third, and more positively, although
the race is to the strong it is also to the swift.
Small and nimble societies are more likely to
be successful than bloated large states. A
fundamental technology shift sets all societies
back to the same starting point and removes
many of the benefits of the incremental
growth of the superseded technologies.
The inflation of the Internet
There is a tendency to genuflect towards the
Internet as some finished and stable product
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whose only limiter is our imagination. Yet, as
I have argued elsewhere [4], the Internet is
inappropriate for scholarly communication: it
is unstable, insecure and with the World Wide
Web a mere six years old, it remains a giant
experimental environment. The size of the
Internet is taken to be huge and numbers
quoted in hundreds of millions of pages
inevitably create an impression of huge size.
While the growth rate of Web pages is
undoubtedly huge, the numbers have been
recalculated by Lesk (1999) to show that
there are the equivalent of about two million
books available ± in other words the Web is
about the size of a decent university library,
but with none of the rubbish filtered out. The
present state of the Internet was usefully
described by A.J. Wright[5], in a comparison
with a traditional library:
. . .the shelves have been removed . . . the
materials lie in huge piles all over the building.
The locks on the door have been changed, and
there are vendors everywhere selling keys . . . you
find the call numbers have been changed into a
language system you do not understand. The
OPAC terminals are gone, but there are voices
everywhere ± you cannot see anyone ± talking
about this or that guide. You pick up the first
book you see and find that its contents have been
transformed into language for which you will
need a special translator. `` Welcome to the
virtual library" says the display[5].
The view of current users was recently and
eloquently described by David Bouchier, an
avowed technophobe. He noted that:
From time to time I venture into the howling
wastes of the Internet. The technocrats promise
us that this information overload will increase a
thousand times, ten thousand times until every
suburban home will have access to every piece of
useless information in the universe (Bouchier,
1994).
I have commented elsewhere and at length on
the inappropriateness of the Internet for
scholarship and on the fact that it is essentially
an immature medium that lacks almost all the
features required for academic discourse. This
can perhaps best be shown by a brief review of
the inadequacy of search engines. It has come
as a shock to many to discover how partial
search engines are. The search engines have
recently come under proper scrutiny. Rather to
everyone's surprise it has become apparent
that they address only a fraction of the
estimated 720 million Web pages. Coverage
varied from a best of 34 per cent for Hotbot to
a worst of 3 per cent for Lycos (Lawrence and
Giles, 1998) Within that, up to 5 per cent of
links were `` broken'' although `` pages that
timed out were not included in these statistics''
(Lawrence and Giles, 1998). This can be
illuminated by an anecdote. On a recent visit
to Aberdeen as an external examiner, I wished
to book a hotel and being an Internet veteran
chose to do a Web search using the two words
`` Aberdeen'' and `` hotel''. The search produced
374,412 hits, the first of which was for a hotel
in Aberdeen, Maryland. The number of hits
exceeds the population of Aberdeen! Now of
course the search could have been refined, but
how much easier to ask a reference librarian
the same question and be presented with the
appropriate pages of Where to Stay in Scotland.
The system is also capable of manipulation.
Companies have emerged in the USA whose
sole activity is to guarantee its customers a
place in the top ten of any Web search, that is
to say a place on the first page of search results.
In sum, then, the Internet does not represent
a finished monolithic product, which we must
accept or reject. It represents an unfinished
and giant project to which we can contribute
and whose development we can influence.
The role of the state
The role of the state in developing society can
now be considered in more detail in the light of
the historical and global background. The state
has first of all the responsibility to deal with
issues of poverty and equity. This might be
caricatured as ensuring education and
communications infrastructure available to all.
As an example of this, it is interesting that
perhaps the first attempt at a national
information policy was the championing of Al
Gore for the creation of the information
superhighway. At the same time the collapse of
the command-driven economies of Eastern
Europe reminds us that the private sector is the
engine of the economy and the role of the state
is to harness its drive and initiative to the public
good. But the state also neglects at its peril the
responsibility to ensure the inclusion of all its
members whether as stakeholder groups such
as libraries or as individual citizens. The
function of the state is to improve lives and here
for the first time libraries might be mentioned.
The Library and Information Commission as
almost its last act released a statement on social
inclusion. Publicly funded libraries are both
major stakeholders in developing and
implementing national information policy and
are one of the tools which the state can use to
improve lives and develop social inclusion.
Combating social exclusion requires an
integrated approach to tackle personal and social
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as well as structural issues. Libraries epitomise
inclusion in their values and activities; and by
their presence in local communities. Through
the facilities and services they provide, libraries
help to build the capacity and resourcefulness of
people and places; and by doing so they make a
major contribution to personal development,
lifelong learning, social cohesion, employability
and enterprise, a sense of neighbourhood, and
the health and well being of communities.
Libraries are the essence of inclusion [6].
The state also has to have a vision of why we are
wiring up society. We're not wiring the world to
get to the Disney Channel or to provide a
society of consumers. Government's role is to
ensure a society at ease with the Information
Society, one that equips its citizens to develop
and grow and be economically satisfied. That
vision of how an information society can be
created is then perhaps best expressed through
a national information policy.
National information policy
The concept of a national information policy
first began to emerge in the early 1990s. In
some countries it emerged as an absence of
policy. Representatives of the Office of Arts
and Libraries, the predecessor of the
Department of Culture, Media and Sports,
used loftily to declare that our national
information policy was not to have a national
information policy. More recently, Tony Blair
has provided a more helpful definition of what
such a policy should be: `` A co-ordinated
strategy, which will focus on transforming
education, widening access, promoting
competition and competitiveness, fostering
quality and modernising government'' [7].
However, Moore (2000) has described a
much more positive set of developments,
typically in smaller countries. In Europe he
perceives a sharp distinction between the small
countries such as Finland, Denmark, Portugal
or the Netherlands, where the state has made a
concentrated effort to develop new information
societies and economies. This development is
mirrored in other smaller states such as
Malaysia or Singapore, with its enviable
concept of `` the intelligent island''. He contrasts
this with the flabby middle European countries
ranging from Austria to England, where
substantial technological change and
investment is taking place but where issues of
scale and co-ordination are preventing coherent
plans from emerging. If one then looks at
Scotland one can then argue that there is a clear
opportunity to escape from the soggy middle
band into the nimble band of countries that can
most easily transform themselves into true
information societies and economies.
National information policy and Scotland
Let me quote again and at some length from
Anthony Giddens's first Reith Lecture, since
it expresses my views much more eloquently
than I can:
Globalisation not only pulls upwards, it pushes
downwards, creating new pressures for local
autonomy. The American sociologist Daniel Bell
expresses this very well when he says that the
nation becomes too small to solve the big
problems, but also too large to solve the small
ones.
Globalisation is the reason for the revival of
local cultural identities in different parts of the
world. If one asks, for example, why the Scots
want more independence in the UK, or why
there is a strong separatist movement in Quebec,
the answer is not to be found only in their
cultural history. Local nationalisms spring up as
a response to globalising tendencies, as the hold
of older nation-states weakens.
Globalisation also squeezes sideways. It creates
new economic and cultural zones within and
across nations. Examples are the Hong Kong
region, northern Italy, or Silicon Valley in
California. The area around Barcelona in
northern Spain extends over into France.
Catalonia, where Barcelona is located, is closely
integrated into the European Union. It is part of
Spain, yet also looks outwards [1].
It is then particularly welcome to see one of the
priorities of the new Scottish Parliament being
the development of Digital Scotland. A whole
series of task groups has been set up to look at
infrastructure, education, the economy and
lifelong learning. The Parliament itself has
committed itself to digital democracy even if it
seems to have little idea as yet of how to
convert the soundbite into action.
Scotland already possesses many of the
building blocks which make an implementable
plan appear a real possibility. When Tony Blair
declared that the three priorities of his
government would be `` Education, education,
education'', this had a great resonance in a
country which has long prized (but often
neglected) its educational system. Then there
is a long tradition in Scotland of public service
and public good and a strong strand of
co-operation. Projects such as SCRAN,
CAIRNS and SCONE and groups such as
SCURL or HEIDS demonstrate in their
names a strong cultural identity and in their
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practice embody co-operation. Wise
investment by bodies such as SHEFC have
ensured a significant national network
infrastructure embodied in the Metropolitan
Area Networks. There is some understanding
of this in the ambition to win the great prize of
a common national network for the education
sector which brings together the plethora of
UK initiatives in this sector. Robert Craig, the
director of SLIC, has imaginatively used the
metaphor of creating six tramways between
Edinburgh and Glasgow or a single high-speed
railway. The benefit of that great prize can be
looked at in terms of the capacity to download
a large file such as the movie Titanic.
Downloading the Titanic
. 28.8Kb modem = 42hrs 30m.
. ISDN Line = 9hrs 14m.
. T1 line (1Mb) = 49m 20sec.
. JANET minimum set (10Mb) = 7m 23sec.
. Strathclyde backbone (1Gb) = 10sec.
(Taken from USA Today, 12 October
1999)
The creation of a national backbone network
will provide a useful litmus test of whether the
settled will of the Parliament is indeed to
create an information society here.
Building an Internet culture
Philip Agre has defined a set of rules [8] for
building an Internet culture and these bear
examination since they emphasise that in the
creation of a new culture and society it is not
the technology but the social structures which
are critical. We should resist the technology
sales pitch. The world is full of snake oil
salesmen and the computing world has a
particularly dense concentration. Remember
that classic definition of a computer as a very
fast idiot. Computers speed up processes but
it might almost be a variant of Murphy's Law
that doing something stupid very fast doesn't
make it any less stupid.
We should not put technology on existing
dysfunctional institutions. Organisations
don't work because the wrong people are
doing the wrong things, not because of
technological weakness. The proper course of
action is to make the organisation functional.
Technology may then help the right people do
the right things better or quicker.
We should develop people not machinery.
The world is littered with unused or
underused technology. Computers which
could run a small country are used for e-mail
and word-processing largely through a failure
properly to skill the workforce. One Scottish
local authority currently has as its
development plan the creation of a thousand
blue-collar apprenticeships. Creating new
jobs is of course eminently laudable, but one
wonders what society will find for a thousand
new carpenters and plumbers to do.
We need to build an Internet civil society. In
last year's Ameritech Lecture, Webster (1999)
recorded the growing dissatisfaction with
politics. Some charities have more members
than our major political parties and voting rates
continue to decline, partly because of the
apparently increasing irrelevance certainly of
local politics. Societies do of course just
happen if left unattended but the sort of society
we all might wish to see develop will benefit
from some building and encouragement.
There is a tendency to treat the Internet and
the World Wide Web as synonyms. They are
not. E-mail is perhaps more important than
the Web since it implies communication
between people rather than a relatively passive
individual activity. The art of letter writing
seems largely to have died out in the middle of
the last century. Curiously it has seen a recent
if somewhat mongrel revival through e-mail
leading to an increase of communication if
not understanding between such groups as
parents and student children.
Perhaps obviously, one should analyse both
the technical and cultural environment.
Building an Internet culture will depend on
identifying the problems or issues first, then
identifying appropriate solutions. Good
outcomes rarely come from identifying
technological solutions then seeking problems
to which they can be applied.
The best use of technology is to amplify
existing sharing. Where institutions are
working together and well, the technology can
be used to enhance this process. There is and
will be a vast range of technological options.
Although it has been argued here that the
information revolution is transformational
rather than representing a continuum of
change, that transformation will be most
readily absorbed through the reform of
existing beneficial structures. It is a mistake to
distribute technology randomly. The history
of UK schools is, for example, littered with
well meant but ill-considered attempts to
distribute technology with no consideration of
the issues surrounding such distribution.
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Initiatives typically fail due to a failure to
address issues of support and sustainability.
Education should be directed to social
organisation not technology. Teaching people
to use a particular bit of hardware or a particular
piece of software is rarely a good investment.
The pace of technological change is such that
the knowledge is often outdated before the
training is completed. An understanding of
concepts and social organisation is much more
relevant. Universities are full of those trained to
use mainframes attempting to use them to
provide Internet solutions.
Machinery does not fix social problems and
institutions. A shared vision of the way ahead
is much more important than the particular
technology currently in use. It is the social and
human issues which will determine whether we
build an information society rather than the
ability to make a particular technology work.
Three challenges
The argument of this lecture can perhaps best
be summed up by posing three challenges to
those who wish to see the development of an
information policy.
First, the management of things. The
Internet is full of a vast array of information in
a huge variety of media. The term coined for
this is `` stuff''. We need to make this `` stuff''
coherent. Librarians have a major role to play
in this. They need to take control of the
management, organisation, filtering and
preservation of this great amorphous mass.
To paraphrase Ranganathan we need to build
structures which will deliver the right
information to the right user at the right time.
Second, the management of relationships.
Despite the claim for a tradition of working
together, this has tended to be sectorally based.
We can already see barriers and firewalls being
erected between different communities and it is
important that these are broken down and a
climate of trust created. For the first time in
recent memory, at least in the UK, the
availability of money is not the first and over-
riding concern. Much more important is the
need to build trust so that local government can
work with higher education, the health service
with industry, even Glasgow with Edinburgh.
In the last year or two Scotland has had a real
sense both of community and purpose and
there can rarely have been a better time to
foster and improve community relationships.
Third, the management of perceptions. It is
critically important that the creation of an
information society is seen as relevant to all
sectors of the country. It is not a luxury; it is
not an add-on; it is not an eÂlitist minority
need. In a counsel of despair, Woody Allan
once wrote that `` More than any other time in
history mankind faces a crossroads. One path
leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The
other to total extinction. Let us pray we have
the wisdom to choose correctly'' (Allen,
1980). This nihilist approach has little to
commend it but humour. If we are to create a
brave new world its relevance has to be seen
and understood by all. A clearly articulated
national information policy is the keystone to
demonstrating that relevance.
Conclusion
Scotland has a long and distinguished tradition
of invention in all sorts of fields. If James Watt
is irredeemably linked with the Industrial
Revolution, names as varied as Alexander
Graham Bell and John Logie Baird and Robert
Watson-Watt have already contributed to the
information revolution, but `` These days are
past now, and in the past they must remain''
[2]. It is my contention that it is time for us to
move from the information revolution to the
information society. In order to do that the
state, in the form of our new Parliament, must
recognise its responsibilities, learn the lessons
of the past and move to create the sort of
environment which a national information
policy must address.
There are half a dozen messages that I would
wish our elected representatives to remember
when they come to consider framing a national
information policy. First tools are just tools. It is
not enough to fill our educational system with
computers or to build a network. We need a
vision of what kind of society we are trying to
create. Second geography is not destiny. It is
quite clear that at least for the moment it is
small and swift acting societies which are
adapting best; Singapore, Finland, Malaysia
and even Vietnam are the sort of countries
which appear to be adapting best, while it is of
the nature of a global communications
revolution that we are removed from the
tyranny of distance. Third, bad management is
not the same as destiny. We are not helpless in
the face of large global conglomerates, but are
quite capable of creating structures that are
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adaptable, hospitable and societal. Fourth, we
should avoid mainframe solutions to Internet
problems. One of the most notable features of
the short history of computing is the rapidity of
the successive waves of technology.
Technologically-based initiatives are unlikely to
prove as productive as innovative thinking.
Fifth, we must recognise that content is king.
Commercial pressures are aimed at converting
us into a nation of mouse potatoes consuming
entertainment and shopping. Yet a nation rich
in culture, industry, invention and science has a
huge contribution to make to the knowledge
economy and we need as part of our vision to be
clear about what we can contribute as well as
consume. And finally, it is irresistible to
conclude without a reference to one role of
librarians in shaping the information society. If
content is king, metadata is the king's
interpreter. There is little point in having seven
hundred million pages of Internet content if one
can find either nothing or too much. Metadata,
otherwise cataloguing in its Sunday clothes, will
be central to an information policy, for it will be
in the management of information that the state
can perhaps find its most effective role.
Let me finish with an image which I have
found sticks in my memory. In the Disney
film Fantasia, one sequence is played out to
Dukas's music, The Sorcerer's Apprentice. In
the cartoon, Mickey Mouse, charged with
cleaning the cellar floor, puts on the sorcerer's
clothes and ignorantly waves the magic wand
at the brooms in the cellar. They begin to
bring in buckets of water and to mop the
floor. But it is soon clear that the brooms and
buckets are out of control and filling the cellar
with water. Only the arrival of the sorcerer
ends the growing nightmare. Jill Foster of
Newcastle University has compared this to
the situation on the Internet. In her image
Mickey Mouse is the archetypal computer
scientist who has unwittingly unleashed
buckets of information onto the network. All
he does serves only to make the situation
worse. But says Foster, all is well, because she
knows who the sorcerer is ± he is the chief
cataloguer of Newcastle University Library. . .
Notes
1 The first lecture in the series by Anthony Giddens
may be found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
static/events/reith_99/week1/week1.htm
2 Much of this section derives from an unpublished
paper given by Kelly McNamara of the World Bank
Institute given at a conference `` Keystone for the
Information Age: a National Information Policy for
the UK'' held at the British Library by the British
Council and the Library and Information
Commission in March 2000.
3 Private communication from Wallace Ewart, Pro
Vice-Chancellor, University of Ulster.
4 For example, in Law, D. (1999), `` Scholarly
communication in an electronic environment: problems
and challenges'', Alexandria, Vol. 11, pp. 135-42.
5 PACS-L contribution of 25 February 1992.
6 Library and Information Commission (2000), Libraries:
The Essence of Inclusion London, Library & Information
Commission, London or at http://www.lic.gov.uk/
publications/policyreports/inclusion.html
7 Introduction to Our Information Age: The
Government's Vision, COI, London, 1998.
8 Based on Agre, P. (1998), ``Building an Internet culture'',
Telematics and Information, Vol. 15, pp. 231-4
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